Eschew Obfuscation: The Right Amount of Airport Security

The Right Amount of Airport Security

Max Dunn — Wed, 16 Aug 2006 09:34:00 -0700

What is the right amount of airport security? Some might say that airport security is useless and terrorists will always find a way around it, so why bother having much. Others might say that they don’t mind the inconvenience and cost and would prefer to have massive amounts of security in order to minimize the threat of any possible terrorist action.

"The Right Amount of Airport Security" by Max Dunn

Wed, 23 Aug 2006 10:39:30 -0700

Good point. If there were different levels of security at airlines, then maybe terrorists would target the most lax airline. It is interesting though, that terrorists don’t seem to go after all the easy targets. For instance, there have been very few subway bombings (except for the one in London) even though though there is NO security on subways.

"The Right Amount of Airport Security" by Eugenek

Mon, 21 Aug 2006 13:41:01 -0700

I once talked to a close friend about Ryanair – discount European airline. He said he flew with them once and would never do that again. Why? He said he saw how they checked the passengers’ papers and that it would be too easy to get on board unchecked. Still, that same person would prefer cheaper connecting flights over a non-stop, which, in my view, is much safer. Clearly, there are different views on air travel safety.

Another issue with having “tight” and “loose” version of security is similar to that of TV heads constantly saying things like “Oh, fortunately they didn’t settle on blowing up Hoover’s Dam, that would have been the end of the country! (or whatever)”, basically advising terrorists very publicly on what they can pick for a target. If you can get an airliner full of kerosene up in the sky on a relaxed-security airline, wouldn’t it simply prompt them to use the opportunity?

I guess there is just no silver bullet against people wanting to do that kind of harm…